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“[L]aw is language and, therefore, for law to be clear, the language of
the law must be clear.”1 The individuals who draft statutes are held to a high
standard of clarity because their choice of language creates the law.2 It is,
however, impossible for anyone to anticipate every question that word
choice or syntax can raise.3 What, then, does a lawyer, a judge, or a justice
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Terri LeClercq, Doctrine of the Last Antecedent: The Mystifying Morass of Ambiguous
Modifiers, 2 LEGAL WRITING INST. 81 (1996).
2
Id. at 85.
3
Id.
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do when a statute is not clear?
The United States Supreme Court recently explained that the proper
starting point for a court in a statutory interpretation dispute “lies in a careful
examination of the ordinary meaning and structure of the law itself.”4 If that
examination “yields a clear answer, judges must stop,”5 lest the legislative
history “be used to ‘muddy’ the meaning of ‘clear statutory language.’”6
Similarly, the Supreme Court of New Jersey has said, “[w]e begin with
the statute’s plain language, which is the ‘best indicator’ of legislative
intent.”7 Generally, the “words and phrases shall be read and construed with
their context, and shall, unless inconsistent with the manifest intent of the
legislature or unless another or different meaning is expressly indicated, be
given their generally accepted meaning, according to the approved usage of
the language.”8
A given act may consist of “many different words, passages,
provisions, and sections.”9 Courts “must determine whether a particular
word, passage, provision, or section is relevant to and probative of an act’s
construction” and “how much of a statute’s context is relevant to and
probative of the final determination of legislative intent or statutory
meaning.”10
If the plain language of the statute leads to a “clear and unambiguous
result,” then the court’s interpretive process is over.11 If, however, there is
ambiguity in the statute, the plain reading leads to an absurd result, or the
overall statutory scheme is at odds with the plain language, then a court may
resort to extrinsic evidence.12
A court does not conclude that an ambiguity exists solely on the basis
that there is a disagreement about what the words convey. Instead, the court
must assess the reasonableness of the positions of the parties based on its
own review of the language in question.13 Once a court determines that
statutory interpretation is required, it may employ a number of different
4
Food Mktg. Inst. v. Argus Leader Media, 139 S. Ct. 2356, 2364 (2019) (citing
Schindler Elevator Corp. v. United States ex rel. Kirk, 131 S. Ct. 1885 (2011)).
5
Id. (citing Hughes Aircraft Co. v. Jacobson, 119 S. Ct. 755 (1999)).
6
Id. (citing Milner v. Department of Navy, 131 S. Ct. 1259 (2011)).
7
State v. Rodriguez, 238 N.J. 105, 113–14 (2019) (citing DiProspero v. Penn, 183 N.J.
477, 492 (2005)).
8
N.J.S.A. § 1:1-1 (West 2019).
9
NORMAN SINGER & SHAMBIE SINGER, 2A SUTHERLAND STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION §
47:2 (7th ed. 2019).
10
Id. (footnote omitted).
11
State v. Rodriguez, 238 N.J. 105, 113–14 (2019) (citing Johnson v. Roselle EZ Quick
LLC, 226 N.J. 370, 386 (2016) (quoting Richardson v. PFRS, 192 N.J. 189 (2007))).
12
Id. (citing DiProspero, 183 N.J. at 492–93 (quoting Cherry Hill Manor Assocs. v.
Faugno, 182 N.J. 64 (2004))).
13
State v. Gandhi, 201 N.J. 161, 178–79 (2010).

THARNEY(DO NOT DELETE)

2020]

4/4/2020 2:04 AM

CANONS OR COIN TOSSES

287

techniques. They are not universally embraced.
It has, for example, been suggested that canons of statutory
interpretation provide only limited assistance in the search for the meaning
of a statute, and that there exist “canons, both in Latin and in English, which
will support almost any approach to interpretation which a court wishes to
adopt.”14 Karl Llewellyn has long been cited for the proposition that for each
and every canon, there is an equal and opposite canon.15
The question fairly arises: are the details of statutory construction, and
the canons of statutory interpretation, of interest only to those toiling in the
relative obscurity of statutory drafting?
In early 2018, national news sources reported that the family-owned
independent Oakhurst Dairy, located in Portland, Maine, had settled an
overtime dispute with its truck drivers by agreeing to pay $5 million to the
drivers in a dispute “that hinged entirely on the lack of an Oxford comma in
state law.”16 The dispute gained “international notoriety” when the United
States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit determined that the missing
comma created sufficient uncertainty to side with the drivers.17 It was noted
that the resolution of the matter by the parties meant that “there will be no
ruling from the land’s highest courts on whether the Oxford comma—the
often-skipped second comma in a series like ‘A, B, and C’—is an
unnecessary nuisance or a sacred defender of clarity, as its fans and
detractors endlessly debate.”18
Other recent cases, decided by both federal and New Jersey state courts,
received far less attention than the Oakhurst Dairy matter, but they served as
frequent examples of the enduring viability of the canons of statutory
interpretation.
We examine below selected examples of statutory interpretation using
“intrinsic” sources: review and analysis of the words and the syntax, a
consideration of the plain or technical meaning of the words, as well as
punctuation and grammar rules. We also examine selected examples of
interpretation using “extrinsic” sources: a review of aspects of the legislative
process pertaining to the enactment of the statute under consideration, the
circumstances before and during enactment, as well as post-enactment
14

Morris-Sussex Area Co. v. Hopatcong Borough, 15 N.J. Tax 438, 443 (1996) (citation
omitted).
15
Karl N. Llewellyn, Remarks on the Theory of Appellate Decision and the Rules
or Canons About How Statutes Are To Be Construed, 3 VAND. L. REV. 395 (1950) (listing
twenty-eight canons of statutory interpretation and their opposites).
16
Daniel Victor, Oxford Comma Dispute is Settled as Maine Drivers Get $5 Million,
N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 9, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/02/09/us/oxford-commamaine.html.
17
Id.
18
Id.
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events and interpretations.
The following pages certainly do not, nor could they, contain an
exhaustive review of this area. Instead, we focus on issues of statutory
interpretation that arose in the ordinary course of the recent work of the New
Jersey Law Revision Commission, whose statutory mandate requires that it
promote and encourage the clarification and simplification of New Jersey’s
law, its better adaptation to present social needs, and secure the better
administration of justice.19
I.

INTRINSIC AIDS TO INTERPRETATION

“Intrinsic” aids for interpretation relate to the language
of a statute itself. Courts have called intrinsic aids “technical
rules of statutory construction,” and aids which “arise from
the composition and structure of [an] act.” However they are
described, intrinsic aids generally are the first resource to
which courts turn to construe an ambiguous statute . . . .
These “intrinsic” aids for construction focus attention on a
statute’s text, and properly reflect the primacy of the
legislature’s own use of language. [footnotes omitted]20
A. The Doctrine of the Last Antecedent
As both English syntax and the law have become more complicated, so
too has the problem of ascertaining the intent or meaning of a statute.21
Linguists have observed that the English language has a tendency to
“cluster,” or “group,” words next to each other that can be interpreted by
readers to form a unit of thought.22 In the late 1880’s, Jabez Gridley
Sutherland analyzed complicated and litigated statutes in an attempt to
resolve future problems of statutory interpretation.23 One result of
Sutherland’s work was his creation of a grammar and punctuation rule that
would become known as the doctrine of the last antecedent.24 That doctrine
provides, in relevant part, that,

19

N.J.S.A. § 1:12A-8 (West 2019).
SINGER & SINGER, supra note 9, § 47:1.
21
LeClercq, supra note 1, at 86.
22
Id. at 87. (citing Lyn Frazier, Syntactic Complexity, in NATURAL LANGUAGE PARSING
135 (David Dowty et. al. eds., 1985)).
23
Id. at 86–87. Jabez Sutherland authored SUTHERLAND ON STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION
(1st ed. 1891).
24
Id. at 87. This doctrine is also known as “the last antecedent rule,” “the rule of last
antecedent,” and ad proximum antecedens fiat relatio nisi impediatur sententia origin
(relative words must ordinarily be referred to the last antecedent, the last antecedent being the
last word which can be made an antecedent so as to give a meaning).
20
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[r]eferential and qualifying phrases, where no contrary
intention appears, refer solely to the last antecedent. The last
antecedent is the “last word, phrase, or clause that can be
made an antecedent without impairing the meaning of the
sentence.” Thus a proviso usually applies to the provision or
clause immediately preceding it . . . .25
Although the doctrine is not the law and is not uniformly accepted, its
strength as an interpretive tool is attributed to the fact that “the last
antecedent rule is merely another aid to [the discovery of] . . . intent or
meaning [of a statute], and [that it] is not inflexible and uniformly binding.”26
The doctrine provides that, “where the sense of an entire act requires
that a qualifying word or phrase apply to several preceding or even
succeeding sections, the qualifying word or phrase is not restricted to its
immediate antecedent . . . .”27 The flexibility incorporated in the doctrine
has been viewed by some as one of its fundamental weaknesses.28 Critics
have remarked that, “[b]ecause the question of whether to apply [the
doctrine] essentially amounts to a coin toss, it seems implausible to rely on
it as a method of inferring actual congressional intent or meaning.”29 Despite
its detractors, use of the doctrine increases in the United States Supreme
Court, the federal Circuit Courts,30 and the New Jersey Judiciary.31
Beginning in 1799, when the United States Supreme Court interpreted
statutes that included a list of terms followed by a limiting clause, the Court
referred in passing to the interpretive strategy known as “the doctrine of the
last antecedent.”32 In 2003, however, the doctrine seemingly achieved an
25

SINGER & SINGER, supra note 9, § 47:33 (7th ed. 2019) (footnotes omitted).
Id. (emphasis added) (citing Borenstein v. Comm’r of Internal Revenue, 919 F.3d 746
(2d Cir. 2019) and Barnhart v. Thomas, 540 U.S. 20 (2003) (“[t]he last antecedent rule is not
absolute and can assuredly be overcome by other indicia of meaning, but construing a statue
in accord with the rule is quite sensible as a matter of grammar.”); and see LeClercq, supra
note 1, at 89 (discussing that linguistic principles are neither rules nor the law; rather, the
principles of linguistics help readers infer meaning).
27
SINGER & SINGER, supra note 9, § 47:33. (citing U.S. v. Babbit, 66 U.S. 55 (1861);
Allstate Ins. Co. v. Mun, 751 F.3d 94 (2d Cir. 2014); In re Federal-Mogul Global Inc., 684
F.3d 355 (3d Cir. 2012); Shendock v. Dir., Office of Workers’ Comp. Programs, 893 F.2d
1458 (3d Cir. 1990); U.S. v. Brandenburg, 144 F.2d 656 (C.C.A. 3d Cir. 1944)).
28
Joseph Kimble, The Doctrine of the Last Antecedent, the Example in Barnhart, Why
Both are Weak, and How Textualism Postures, 16 SCRIBES J. LEGAL WRITING 5, 8 (2014–15)
(quoting Jeremy Ross, A Rule of Last Resort: A History of the Doctrine of the Last Antecedent
in the United States Supreme Court, 39 SW. L. REV. 325, 336 (2009)).
29
Id.
30
Id. at 8.
31
See, e.g., State v. Gelman, 195 N.J. 475, 484 (2008); and, C.R. v. M.T., No. A0139018T4, 2019 N.J. Super LEXIS 158, at *7–9 (App. Div. Nov. 13, 2019).
32
Lockhart v. United States, 136 S. Ct. 958, 963 (2016) (citing Sims Lessee v. Irvine, 3
Dall. 425 (1799); FTC v. Mandel Brothers Inc., 359 U.S. 385, 389 n. 4 (1959); Barnhart v.
Thomas, 540 U.S. 20, 26 (2003)).
26
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increase in status when it was announced as a grammatical rule in Barnhart
v. Thomas.33
In Barnhart, the Supreme Court interpreted the federal Social Security
Income (“SSI”) statutes, determining whether an applicant was eligible for
benefits.34 For purposes of collecting SSI, 42 U.S.C. §§ 423(d)(2)(A) and
1382c(a)(3)(B) provide that a person is disabled “only if his physical or
mental impairment . . . [is] of such severity that he is not only unable to do
his previous work but cannot, considering his age, education, and work
experience, engage in any other kind of substantial gainful work which exists
in the national economy.”35
The Court, after analyzing the syntax, determined that the statutes
establish two requirements.36 An impairment must render the individual
“unable to do his previous work” and must also preclude the individual from
“engag[ing] in any other kind of substantial gainful work.”37 Invoking the
“rule” of the last antecedent, the Court found that the clause “which exists in
the national economy” qualifies the latter requirement.38 Pursuant to this
newly announced “rule:”
A limiting clause or phrase . . . should ordinarily be
read as modifying only the noun or phrase that it
immediately follows . . . . While this rule is not an absolute
and can assuredly be overcome by other indicia of meaning,
we have said that construing a statute in accord with the rule
is “quite sensible as a matter of grammar.”39
Doing so “reflects the basic intuition that when a modifier appears at
the end of a list, it is easier to apply that modifier only to the item directly
before it.”40
Thirteen years after the Barnhart decision, in Lockhart v. United States,
the Supreme Court considered a case in which the defendant pled guilty in
federal court to the possession of child pornography.41 The defendant had a
prior state conviction for first-degree sexual abuse involving his adult
girlfriend.42 His pre-sentence report concluded that he was subject to a tenyear mandatory minimum sentence.43 The report also noted that a statutory
33
34
35
36
37
38
39
40
41
42
43

Barnhart, 540 U.S. at 26.
Id. at 20.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Barnhart v. Thomas, 540 U.S. 20, 26 (2003) (emphasis added).
Lockhart v. United States, 136 S. Ct. 958, 963 (2016).
Id.
Id. at 960.
Id.
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sentence enhancement was triggered by the defendant’s prior state
convictions for crimes “relating to aggravated sexual abuse, sexual abuse, or
abusive sexual conduct involving a minor or ward.”44
The defendant argued that the limiting phrase, “involving a minor or
ward,” applied to all three crimes.45 The District Court disagreed.46 The
Second Circuit affirmed, and the Supreme Court granted certiorari.47 After
examining the internal logic of the statute, its place in the overall statutory
scheme, and the legislative history, the Supreme Court concluded that the
doctrine of the last antecedent was well supported by the context and
structure of the statute.48
Although the last New Jersey Supreme Court case discussing the
doctrine of the last antecedent was State v. Gelman,49 decided in 2008, the
New Jersey Appellate Division has considered more recent cases invoking
the doctrine. Since the Court in Gelman ultimately resolved the statutory
ambiguity in favor of the defendant under the doctrine of lenity,50
consideration of recent Appellate Division decisions follows.

44

Id. (emphasis added). The italicized portion of the statute is commonly referred to as
the “limiting phrase,” “limiting clause,” or the “qualifying phrase.”
45
Id. (emphasis added).
46
Lockhart v. United States, 136 S. Ct. 958, 960.
47
Id. at 960. The Eighth Circuit interpreted the qualifying phrase “involving a minor or
ward” to apply to each of the offenses.
48
Id. at 960, 968.
49
State v. Gelman, 195 N.J. 475 (2008). This doctrine was subsequently discussed by
the Appellate Division in Mountain Hill, L.L.C. v. Zoning Bd. of Adjustment of Twp. of
Middletown, 403 N.J. Super. 201 (App. Div. 2008) (confirming that where no contrary
intention appears, qualifying words refer solely to the last antecedent); Alexander v. Bd. of
Rev., 405 N.J. Super. 408 (App. Div. 2009) (explaining that if the modifier is intended to
relate to more than the last antecedent, a “comma” is used to set off the modifier from the
entire series); Maccarone v. State, 2011 WL 2478636 (App. Div. Jun. 23, 2011) (finding that
the use of a semicolon indicates an intention on the part of the legislature to separate the first
group in the statutory list from those set forth in the modifying clause); Mahwah Realty Assoc.
v. Twp. of Mahwah, 430 N.J. Super. 247 (App. Div. 2013) (noting that in the absence of
intrinsic or extrinsic evidence to the contrary, the court must logically interpret a statute
according to its literal wording and natural connotation); and, Kamienski v. State, Dept. of
Treas., 451 N.J. Super. 499 (App. Div. 2017) following State v. Gelman, 195 N.J. 475, 484
(2008) (the doctrine of last antecedent holds that unless a contrary intention otherwise
appears, a qualifying phrase within a statute refers to the last antecedent phrase). In addition,
the doctrine was most recently discussed by the Tax Court in Bentz v. Twp. of Little Egg
Harbor, 30 N.J. Tax 530 (Tax 2018) (noting that the general rule of statutory construction is
that the modifying phrase applies to the last antecedent phrase, absent contrary intent and the
use of a comma to separate a modifier from an antecedent phrase indicates an intent to apply
the modifier to all previous antecedent phrases).
50
Gelman, 195 N.J. at 497 (noting that Justice Rivera-Soto dissented, adopted an
interpretation of the statute similar to the one proffered by the State).

THARNEY (DO NOT DELETE)

292

SETON HALL LEGISLATIVE JOURNAL

4/4/2020 2:04 AM

[Vol. 44:2

In State v. Malik, the defendant was convicted by a jury of first-degree
aggravated sexual assault and sentenced to a ten-year prison term subject to
the “No Early Release Act” (NERA).51 The defendant appealed.52 He argued
that he had asked the trial court judge to charge the jury with the definition
of “mentally incapacitated” set forth in N.J.S.A. 2C:14-1(i).53 He withdrew
the request after the trial court said that it did not see how it would assist him
and that the State had not charged mentally incapacitated in the indictment.54
The Appellate Division, however, discussed this defined term in its opinion.
The Appellate Division observed that the indictment was predicated
upon the fact that the defendant “knew” or “should have known” that the
victim was “physically helpless.”55 The State offered evidence that the
victim had voluntarily consumed alcohol and proffered that her intoxicated
state proved that she met the definition of “physically helpless” and not
“mentally incapacitated.”56 In considering the propriety of a “mental
incapacitation” charge, the court examined the definition set forth in N.J.S.A.
2C:14-1(i),57 which defines “mentally incapacitated” as “that condition in
which a person is rendered temporarily incapable of understanding or
controlling his conduct due to the influence of a narcotic, anesthetic,
intoxicant, or other substance administered to that person without his prior
knowledge or consent . . . .”58
The court determined that “[t]here was no evidence that [the victim]
ingested any substance without her knowledge or consent, or under any
situation of which she did not have knowledge or control.”59 Absent such
proof, the court determined that it would have been improper and confusing
to the jury to include this definition in a jury charge.60 The court also
determined that the phrase “administered to that person without his prior
knowledge or consent” qualified all four statutory terms: narcotics,

51

State v. Malik, No. A-2683-16T2, 2018 N.J. Super. Unpub. LEXIS 2697, at *1 (Super.
Ct. App. Div. Dec. 10, 2018).
52
Id.
53
Id. at *9. The defendant raised seven points in his appellate brief. Only point IV,
however, is germane to the discussion raised herein. The other six points raised in the
defendant’s brief have been omitted from this discussion.
54
Id.
55
Id. at *10.
56
Id. See N.J.S.A. 2C:14-1(h) (defining “physically helpless” as a “condition in which
a person is unconscious or is physically unable to flee or is physically unable to communicate
unwillingness to act”).
57
State v. Malik, No. A-2683-16T2, 2018 N.J. Super. Unpub. LEXIS 2697, at *1, *28
(Super. Ct. App. Div. Dec. 10, 2018).
58
Id. (emphasis added).
59
Id. at *28–*29.
60
Id. at *29.
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anesthetics, intoxicants and other substances.61 This reading of the statute
limits the term “mentally incapacitated” to victims that are rendered
temporarily incapable of understanding or controlling their conduct only
when they are administered substances without their prior knowledge or
consent.
Eleven months later, the Appellate Division examined the same statute,
and the result was an entirely different interpretation.62 In C.R. v. M.T., the
plaintiff commenced an action under the Sexual Assault Survivor Protection
Act (SASPA) to restrain the defendant from having any communication or
contact with her.63 The parties did not dispute that sexual contact occurred.64
After hearing the testimony of the parties, the trial court found the parties’
competing versions of the events to be “equally plausible,” determining, as
a result, that the plaintiff failed to prove that her version was more likely true
than defendant’s.65 The plaintiff appealed.66
The Appellate Division noted that the “factual dispute about consent
turned on whether there was a ground upon which it could be found [that the]
plaintiff was incapable of consenting.”67 A sexual assault victim is “one
whom the actor knew or should have known was,” among other things,
“mentally incapacitated.”68
The court in C.R. recognized that one reading of the statute “might
suggest a requirement that the alleged victim prove her involuntary
intoxication, that is, that she ingested intoxicants administered to [her]
without [her] prior knowledge or consent.”69
The court “engage[d] the doctrine of the last antecedent” after noting
that the Legislature listed the substances that could generate mental
incapacity and followed them with a qualifying phrase.70 The court
emphasized the absence of a comma after the last antecedent “other
substance.”71 It determined that the absence of this comma, in conjunction
with the doctrine of last antecedent, “requires our conclusion that the

61
See Lockhart v. United States, 136 S. Ct. 958, 970; see also Series Qualifier Canon,
BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014). This method of interpretation is predicated upon
the “Series Qualifier Canon.”
62
C.R. v. M.T., 461 N.J. Super. 341 (App. Div. Nov. 13, 2019).
63
Id. at 343; see also N.J.S.A. §§ 2C:14-13 to 21.
64
C.R., 461 N.J. Super. at 343.
65
Id. at 346.
66
Id. at 343.
67
Id.
68
Id. (citing N.J.S.A. 2C:14-2(a)(7)).
69
Id. at 347; see also State v. Malik, No. A-2683-16T2, 2018 WL 6441507, at *1 (App.
Div. Dec. 10, 2018).
70
C.R. v. M.T., 461 N.J. Super. 341, 348 (App. Div. Nov. 13, 2019).
71
Id.
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qualifying phrase applies only to ‘other substances’ and not [the term]
‘intoxicant.’”72 The court further reasoned that the Legislature intended to
place the comma where it was.73 Although the comma is “a mere punctuation
mark to be sure, [its presence] would grammatically call for a different
result.”74 The court “confidently conclude[d] that the Legislature’s omission
of a comma after ‘other substance’ was intended to invoke the doctrine of
the last antecedent in the construction of N.J.S.A. 2C:14-1(i), thereby
conveying the Legislature’s intent that the phrase would qualify only ‘other
substance.’”75
Textual analysis of the term “mentally incapacitated,” as defined in
N.J.S.A. 2C:14-1(i), is subject to competing, plausible interpretations. One
would find that an individual was mentally incapacitated only if he or she
was administered a narcotic, anesthetic, intoxicant, or other substance
without their prior knowledge or consent. The other would find the same
individual mentally incapacitated if he or she was rendered temporarily
incapable of understanding or controlling their conduct because they either
voluntarily ingested a narcotic, anesthetic, or an intoxicant or was
administered a substance without their prior knowledge or consent.
Arguably, the ambiguity created by the two diametrically opposed
interpretations of the statute by two separate appellate courts suggests that
statutory revision might more clearly express the intent of the Legislature.
B. In Pari Materia as an Intrinsic Interpretive Aid
“When attempting to discover the legislative intent, the statute must be
read in light of the old law, the mischief sought to be eliminated and the
proposed remedy.”76 One method of analyzing a statute is to read it in pari
materia. Translated from Late Latin, in pari materia literally means “[u]pon
the same matter or subject.”77 When employed as a means of statutory
construction, this canon provides that, “[s]tatutes that deal with the same
matter or subject should be read [. . .] and construed together as a unitary and
harmonious whole.”78
72

Id.
Id. (“To convey some other meaning, the Legislature would have had to insert a
comma after ‘other substance.’”).
74
Id.
75
Id.
76
Correa v. Grossi, 458 N.J. Super. 571, 580 (App. Div. 2019) (citing Bd. of Ed. of Sea
Isle City v. Kennedy, 196 N.J. 1, 13 (2008)).
77
In Pari Materia, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (5th ed. 1979); see also 2A SUTHERLAND
STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION § 51.3 (7th ed. 2007) (statutes are in pari materia, pertain to the
same subject matter, when they relate to the same person, thing or to the same class of persons
or things).
78
Marino v. Marino, 200 N.J. 315, 330 (2009).
73
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The first reference to in pari materia by the New Jersey Judiciary seems
to have been in 1793.79 The Supreme Court of Judicature of New Jersey
analyzed two statutory sections, enacted at different times, concerning the
monetary amount of a suit required to permit the collection of costs.80 The
question before the court “depend[ed] altogether upon the construction of the
acts of assembly upon this subject, and in forming our opinion we must be
guided by the designs and intentions of the legislature, so far as they are to
be gathered from expressions which they have employed.”81 The court
noted, “[t]hese statutes being made in pari materia, are to be construed
together.”82 According to the court, because there was “no clause in the latter
repealing the former, we must consider it as operating to raise the sum within
which costs are not recoverable.”83 The former statute was regarded by the
court as “reflecting light upon the other, and explanatory of its meaning.”84
Finding that the second suit was necessitated by the result of the first, the
court allowed the plaintiff to recover his full cost.85
In the recent case of Collas v. Raritan River Garage, Inc., in the context
of an attorney fee award to a former employee’s spouse, who received a
compensation award of dependent benefits until death or remarriage, the
court acknowledged, “we often read statutes in pari materia to give effect to
the Legislature’s will enacting separate laws on the same subject
matter . . . .”86 Where the court cannot discern a link between the proffered
statutes, the court will not infer one.87 In fact, New Jersey courts have
expressly cautioned against the “over-reliance on maxims of statutory
construction,” noting that “[t]he adventitious occurrence of like or similar
phrases, or even of similar subject matter, in laws enacted for wholly
different
ends
will
normally not justify
applying
the
rule
88
of in pari materia construction.”
Along those lines is the court’s treatment of in pari materia in the case
of Air Brook Limousine, Inc. v. Director, Division of Taxation.89 In Air
Brook, the court addressed a tax dispute concerning a car service company.
79

Baracliff’s Ex’r v. Griscom’s Adm’r, 1 N.J.L. 193, 195 (1793).
Id.
81
Id. at 194.
82
Id. at 195.
83
Id.
84
Id.
85
Baracliff’s Ex’r v. Griscom’s Adm’r, 1 N.J.L. 193, 195–96 (1793).
86
Collas v. Raritan River Garage, Inc., 460 N.J. Super. 279, 283 (App. Div. 2019).
87
Id. (finding no link that tethers the 450-week period in N.J.S.A. 34:15-12 and portions
of N.J.S.A. 34-15-13 to the calculation of counsel fees governed by N.J.S.A. 34:15-64).
88
Marino v. Marino, 200 N.J. 315, 331 (2009) (quotations omitted).
89
Air Brook Limousine, Inc. v. Dir., Div. of Taxation, No. A-3861-10T3, 2012 WL
3166607, at *10 (App. Div. 2012), certif. denied, 213 N.J. 568, 65 A.3d 835 (2013).
80
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It was the position of Air Brook that it was not required to pay sales and use
tax on its vehicles.90 The Tax Court and Appellate Division disagreed,
finding that Air Brook’s vehicles—sedans and limousines—did not qualify
as a “bus” for tax exemption.91 N.J.S.A. 54:32B-8.28 reads, in pertinent part:
Receipts from sales of buses for public passenger
transportation, including repair and replacement parts and
labor therefor, to bus companies whose rates are regulated
by the Interstate Commerce Commission or the Department
of Transportation or to an affiliate of said bus companies or
to common or contract carriers for their use in the
transportation of children to and from school are exempt
from the tax imposed under the Sales and Use Tax Act.92
The Sales and Use Tax (“SUT”) Act does not define the term “bus.”93 Air
Brook took the position that the exemption contained in the SUT Act should
be read in pari materia with definitions contained in Title 39 (Motor
Vehicles and Traffic Regulation) and Title 48 (Public Utilities).94
Title 39 defines “omnibus” as a “motor vehicle used for the
transportation of passengers for hire, except commuter vans and vehicles
used in ridesharing arrangements and school buses.”95 Title 48 defines
“autobus” as “any motor vehicle or motorbus operated over public highways
or public places in this State for the transportation of passengers for hire in
intrastate business, whether used in regular route, casino, charter or special
bus operations, notwithstanding such motor vehicle or motorbus may be used
in interstate commerce.”96 Although the SUT Act’s bus exemption was
enacted almost a decade before the Title 48 “autobus” definition, both
statutory sections were later subject to technical corrections in the same
bill.97
In 1990, the Legislature added a SUT Act tax exemption for
limousines,98 which cross-referenced the Title 39 definition of “limousine,”
but left the bus exemption untouched. Other SUT Act exemptions make
specific cross-reference to definitions found in other statutes.99 All of the
90

Id. at *1.
Id. at *1 and *11.
92
N.J.S.A. § 54:32B-8.28 (emphasis added).
93
Air Brook Limousine, Inc. v. Dir., Div. of Taxation, No. A-3861-10T3, 2012 WL
3166607, at *5 (App. Div. 2012), certif. denied, 213 N.J. 568, 65 A.3d 835 (2013).
94
Id. at *6 and *9.
95
N.J.S.A. § 39:1-1.
96
N.J.S.A. § 48:4-1.
97
Air Brook Limousine, Inc. v. Dir., Div. of Taxation, No. A-3861-10T3, 2012 WL
3166607, at *8 (App. Div. 2012), certif. denied, 213 N.J. 568, 65 A.3d 835 (2013).
98
N.J.S.A. § 54:32B-8.52 (citing N.J.S.A. 39:3-195).
99
See N.J.S.A. § 54:32B–8.6 (referring to the definition of “manufactured home” in
91
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vehicles in question in the Air Brook case were registered with the State
Motor Vehicle Commission (“MVC”) as “omnibus” vehicles, all bore
omnibus license plates, and all carried $1.5 million in insurance as required
by the MVC for buses.100
The Air Brook court, however, declined to apply an in pari materia
reading of the three statutes. The court said that while the “SUT bus
exemption and Titles 39 and 48 may all deal with buses, [. . .] that superficial
overlap does not mean that they are in pari materia.”101 The court said that
“[g]iven the risk of impinging on the legislative function, our courts consider
it ‘better to wait for necessary corrections by those authorized to make them,
or, in fact, for them to remain unmade, however desirable they may be.’”102
Finally, within the Local Land and Building Laws (“LLBL”), there are
two statutes that permit a governmental entity to lease property to private
individuals.103 N.J.S.A. 40A:12-14 provides, in relevant part, that:
Any county or municipality may lease any real
property, capital improvement or personal property not
needed for public use as set forth in the resolution or
ordinance authorizing the lease, other than county or
municipal real property otherwise dedicated or restricted
pursuant to law, and except as otherwise provided by law,
all such leases shall be made in the manner provided by this
section.
(a) In the case of a lease to a private person, except for
a lease to a private person for a public purpose as provided
in . . . (C. 40A:12-15), said lease shall be made to the highest
bidder by open public bidding at auction or by submission
of sealed bids.104

N.J.S.A. § 54:4–1.4); N.J.S.A. § 54:32B–8.8 (referring to the definition of “motor fuels” in the
Motor Fuel Tax Law, N.J.S.A. §§ 54:39–101 to –149); N.J.S.A. § 54:32B–8.15 (referring to
the definition of “farming enterprise” in N.J.S.A. § 54:32B–8.16); N.J.S.A. § 54:32B–8.16
(defining “farming enterprise”); N.J.S.A. § 54:32B–8.45 (referring to the definition of
“cigarette” in the Cigarette Tax Act, N.J.S.A. §§ 54:40A–1 to –66); N.J.S.A. § 54:32B–8.52
(defining “limousine” by reference to N.J.S.A. § 39:3– 9.5); N.J.S.A. § 54:32B–2(mm)
(referring to the definition of “mobile communications services” in 4 U.S.C. § 124).
100
Air Brook Limousine, Inc. v. Dir., Div. of Taxation, No. A-3861-10T3, 2012 WL
3166607, at *4 (App. Div. 2012), certif. denied, 213 N.J. 568, 65 A.3d 835 (2013).
101
Air Brook Limousine, Inc. v. Dir., Div. of Taxation, No. A-3861-10T3, 2012 WL
3166607, at *10 (App. Div. 2012), certif. denied, 213 N.J. 568, 65 A.3d 835 (2013).
102
Id. at *7 (quoting R.R. Comm’n v. Grand Trunk Western R. Co., 100 N.E. 852, 855
(Ind. 1913)).
103
See N.J.S.A. 40A:12-14 and N.J.S.A. 40A:12-24.
104
N.J.S.A. 40A:12-14.

THARNEY (DO NOT DELETE)

298

SETON HALL LEGISLATIVE JOURNAL

4/4/2020 2:04 AM

[Vol. 44:2

Historically, this statute was one of the first to mandate public bidding when
a governmental unit proposed to lease its property to a private person.105
Within the same chapter of the LLBL, however, N.J.S.A. 40A:4-24 provides
that:
Every county or municipality may lease for fixed and
upon prescribed terms and for private purposes any of the
land or buildings or any part thereof not presently needed
for public use to the person who will pay the highest rent
therefor. The use by the lessee shall be of such character as
not to be detrimental to the building or the use of the
building or the use of the unleased part of the building.106
The origin of this statute can be traced to R.S. 40:60-42, which in turn
originated with the Home Rule Act of 1917.107
In Sellitto v. Borough of Spring Lake Heights, a residential property
owner sought injunctive relief to restrain the governmental unit from leasing
municipal property adjacent to his land to a cellular telephone
communications facility.108 The plaintiff alleged that the lease was null and
void because it did not comply with the competitive bidding requirements
set forth in the LLBL.109 The Borough argued that N.J.S.A. 40A:12-24
allows a municipality to dispense with the public bidding requirement when
leasing property to a private person.110 The Borough contended that if the
Legislature had intended otherwise, N.J.S.A. 40A:12-24 would contain
express language regarding public bidding much like the language found in
N.J.S.A. 40A:12-14.111 The trial court denied the plaintiffs’ applications and
concluded that N.J.S.A. 40A:12-24 permitted the lease to be executed
without the necessity of public bidding.112 The plaintiff appealed.113
The Appellate Division was confronted with “two statutory provisions
which were arguably controlling, both of which were contained within the
LLBL and which were enacted on the same day . . . .”114 The “real question,”
105

Sellitto v. Borough of Spring Lake Heights, 284 N.J. Super. 277, 285 (App. Div.

1995).
106

N.J.S.A. 40A:4-24.
Sellitto, 284 N.J. Super. at 285.
108
Id.
109
Id. at 281–82. The plaintiff also alleged, among other things, that the borough failed
to adhere to its own zoning ordinances by allowing a non-permitted use to be constructed in
a residential zone. A discussion of these arguments has been omitted from this Report because
they exceed the scope of the instant discussion.
110
Id. at 286.
111
Id. at 285.
112
Sellitto v. Borough of Spring Lake Heights, 284 N.J. Super. 277, 283–84 (App. Div.
1995).
113
Id. at 284.
114
Id. at 285.
107

THARNEY(DO NOT DELETE)

2020]

4/4/2020 2:04 AM

CANONS OR COIN TOSSES

299

according to the Appellate Division, was whether N.J.S.A. 40A:12-14 or
N.J.S.A. 40A:12-40(a) controls these transactions.115 In the absence of
legislative history, the court struggled to determine the reason why two
contradictory statutes exist within the same act.116 The court observed that:
[O]n the same day and within the same bill[, the
Legislature]: (1) enacted a new provision (§ 14) which set
forth in considerable detail the procedures which had to be
followed by a municipality when it leased its public lands
for a private purpose; and, (2) retained an older source
provision (§ 24) which merely required the municipality to
find the person willing to pay the highest rent for land or
buildings not presently needed for public use before leasing
the property.117
It was “not a question . . . of the more general statute yielding to the more
specific; nor [was] it a question of the older statute yielding to the more
recent.”118 Instead, the answer lies within the case law interpreting the LLBL
and the Local Public Contracts Law (“LPCL”).119 The underlying purpose
of the LPCL is to foster openness in local government activities.120 It was
enacted to “secure competition which, in turn, works to protect the public
against chicanery and fraud in public office.”121 To achieve the purposes of
the Act, the LPCL envisions, with certain exceptions, a system of
competitive bidding,122 the purpose of which is to obtain the best economic
result for the public entity and ultimately for the taxpayer.123
In Wasserman’s Inc. v. Middletown Twp., the New Jersey Supreme
Court considered whether N.J.S.A. 40A:12-14 should be applied
retroactively.124 The court noted that N.J.S.A. 40A:12-14 specifically
replaced N.J.S.A. 40:60-42,125 but never mentioned N.J.S.A. 40A:12-24,

115
116
117
118

Id. at 286.
Id.
Id. at 286–87.
Sellitto v. Borough of Spring Lake Heights, 284 N.J. Super. 277, 287 (App. Div.

1995).
119

See generally N.J.S.A. 40A:11-1 to 11-49.
See Closter Service Stations, Inc. v. Comm’rs of Village of Ridgefield Park, 99 N.J.
Super. 69, 73 (Super Ct. App. Div. 1968) (noting that the Local Public Contracts Law
“guard[s] against favoritism, improvidence, extravagance, and corruption” (citing Hillside
Twp. v. Sternin, 25 N.J. 317 (1957)); see also Bodies by Lembo, Inc. v. County of Middlesex,
286 N.J. Super. 298 (Super. Ct. App. Div. 1996).
121
Closter Service Stations, 99 N.J. Super. at 73.
122
N.J. Stat. § 40A:11-13
123
Sellitto, 284 N.J. Super. at 287.
124
Wasserman’s Inc. v. Middletown Twp., 137 N.J. 238, 243 (1994).
125
Id.
120
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despite the fact that its language is identical to that of N.J.S.A. 40:60-42. 126
The decision of the Supreme Court in Wasserman gave the Sellitto
court pause while it considered the purpose of N.J.S.A. 40A:12-24.
Ultimately, however, the Sellitto court made reference to the “rule of
construction that statutes which deal with same matter or subject and seek to
achieve the same overall legislative purpose should be read
in pari materia most obviously applies when statutes in question were
enacted during same session or went into effect at same time, or where they
make specific reference to one another.”127 The court added, “if N.J.S.A.
40:60-42 has been replaced by § 14, we cannot ascertain what purpose the
current § 24 serves.”128 The court concluded that, “§ 14 prevails over § 24.
Otherwise no public bidding would be required for leasing public land and
buildings not presently needed . . . .”129 With regard to the viability of
N.J.S.A. 40A:12-24, the court said, “[w]e cannot reconcile why the
Legislature would adopt a statute with conflicting language.”130 The
determination of the court appears to support a modification of the statute to
address the conflicting language.
Although not uniformly applauded, or applied, the doctrine remains in
broad and current use, as is demonstrated by the fact that it has been
referenced in more than 1,000 New Jersey cases.131 Even when the courts do
not base their determination on an in pari materia reading of multiple
statutory sections, the doctrine still seems to serve as a useful analytical
paradigm.
II. EXTRINSIC AIDS TO INTERPRETATION
Chief Justice Marshall once noted that:
“[w]here the mind labours to discover the design of the
legislature, it seizes everything from which aid can be
derived.” Consonant with this idea, courts construing an
ambiguous statute do not limit their search for legislative
intent to sources in the published act, known as “intrinsic”
126

See Sellitto, 284 N.J. Super. at 288.
Id. (citing Mimkon v. Ford, 66 N.J. 426, 433-34 (1975)).
128
Id.
129
Id. See also N.J. Highlands Coal. v. N.J. Dep’t of Envtl. Prot., 236 N.J. 208, 214
(2018) (cautioning that [t]he adventitious occurrence of like or similar phrases, or even of
similar subject matter, in laws enacted for wholly different ends will normally not justify
applying the rule” of the [in pari materia construction]).
130
Id. at 289.
131
Westlaw search on February 25, 2020, for “in pari materia” returned a result of 1,007
cases in New Jersey.
127
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aids . . . Instead, courts also may consider sources beyond the
printed page. These sources from outside a statute’s text are
known as “extrinsic” aids to interpretation. Extrinsic aids
relate to a statute’s history, and may be legislative, executive,
judicial, or nongovernmental in origin. [footnotes omitted]132
A. Temporal Analysis
Intrinsic sources of statutory interpretation do not stray from the words
of the statute. Reliance solely on this approach, advocated by textualists,
attempts to define the statute, and resolve any ambiguities by examining the
text itself, without reference to external sources.133 Other options, such as
consideration of legislative intent, are largely discounted.134
Intentionalists, on the other hand, examine the purposes statutes were
intended to serve by examining extrinsic sources such as legislative
histories.135 The New Jersey Supreme Court has suggested on many
occasions that “the goal of statutory interpretation is to ascertain and
effectuate the legislature’s intent.”136
Still others claim that neither of those approaches are reliable or
sufficiently useful.137 Critics point out that regardless of the approach, the
context of the potential application matters, and even then, “context” itself is
a fraught concept which does not yield predictable results.138
There is, however, a manner of looking at statutes without limited
analysis of the words of the law itself, but that also avoids relying on
secondary, perhaps subjective, sources. An inquiry into the timing of a
statute exemplifies such an approach and can be useful in statutory
interpretation. Examining the timing of a statute may help provide the
elusive context, since one literally looks at when the statute was enacted, and
how it interacts with other statutes dealing with the same subject.
132
§ 48:1. Extrinsic Aids to Interpretation, 2A SUTHERLAND STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION
§ 48:1 (7th ed. 2019).
133
ANTONIN SCALIA., COMMON-LAW COURTS IN A CIVIL-LAW SYSTEM: THE ROLE OF
UNITED STATES FEDERAL COURTS IN INTERPRETING THE CONSTITUTION AND LAWS 17
(Princeton University Press 1995) (“It is the law that governs, not the intent of the lawgiver.”
[emphasis in original])
134
Id. at 32 (“But assuming, contrary to all reality, that the search for “legislative intent”
is a search for something that exists, that something is not likely to be found in the archives
of legislative history.”)
135
J. Clark Kelso & Charles D. Kelso, Statutory Interpretation: Four Theories in
Disarray, 53 S.M.U. L. REV. 81,86 (2000).
136
State v. Olivero, 221 N.J. 632, 639 (2015); see also State v. Lenihan, 219 N.J. 251,
262 (2014); State in Interest of K.O., 217 N.J. 83, 91 (2014).
137
See Frank H. Easterbrook, “The Absence of Method in Statutory Interpretation,” 84
U. OF CHICAGO LAW REV. 81 (2017).
138
Id. at 83.
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We consider, on the following pages, the effect of timing when statutes
contain conflicting provisions, when an enacted statute might imply repeal
of a prior statute, when statutes are intended to apply retroactively, and when
statutes are “borrowed” from other jurisdictions or based upon a model or
uniform act.
New Jersey courts use a pragmatic approach for resolving potentially
conflicting statutes, rather than hewing to a strict ideology. The Appellate
Division has said that “[s]tatutes are to be read sensibly rather than
literally.”139 The goal of our courts is always to allow for the greatest
possible expression of legislative intent.140 They “are enjoined to reconcile
conflicts and read the laws as consistent to give effect to both expressions of
the Legislature’s purpose.”141 This is so even when there is a conflict
involving the same subject.142 Statutes addressing the same area of law
should be read together and construed together, so that neither statute is
rendered invalid.143
When reconciliation is not possible, courts may look to two possible
points of distinction: specific versus general,144 and later versus earlier.145
When one statute is specific and the other general, the specific statute will
generally govern.146 Additionally, “[w]here two statutes deal with the same
subject matter, the more recent enactment prevails as the latest expression of
legislative will.”147 New Jersey courts recognize that where a later act
“covers the whole subject” that was addressed by an earlier act, the
“inescapable conclusion” is that the Legislature intended for the later act to
control.148 These canons may be employed in a single instance to achieve
139
Chicago Title Ins. Co. v. Bryan, 388 N.J. Super. 550, 557 (Super. Ct. App. Div. 2006),
citing New Jersey State League of Municipalities v. Dep’t of Cmty. Affairs, 310 N.J. Super.
224, 234 (Super. Ct. App. Div. 1998).
140
New Jersey State League of Municipalities v. Dep’t of Cmty. Affairs, 310 N.J. Super.
224, 234 (Super. Ct. App. Div. 1998), ref. State v. Szemple, 135 N.J. 406, 422 (1994) (“[I]n
times when plain language creates uncertainties, courts must construe the statute in a manner
that best effectuates the Legislature’s intent.”).
141
New Jersey State League of Municipalities v. Dep’t of Cmty. Affairs, 310 N.J. Super.
224, 234 (App. Div. 1998).
142
Id.
143
Marino v. Marino, 200 N.J. 315, 330 (2009).
144
Williams v. American Auto Logistics, 226 N.J. 117, 127 (2016).
145
Kemp by Wright v. State, County of Burlington, 147 N.J. 294, 306-7 (1997) (quoting
NORMAN SINGER, 1A SUTHERLAND ON STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION § 23.09, at 338-39 (5th ed.
1993)).
146
Scott v. New Jersey Dept. of Corrections, 6 A.3d 476, 480 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div.
2010) (citing State v. Cagno, 978 A.2d 921, 952 (App. Div. 2009)).
147
In re Fed.-Mogul Glob. Inc., 684 F.3d 355, 374 (3d Cir. 2012) (citing NORMAN SINGER
& SHAMBIE SINGER, 2B SUTHERLAND ON STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION § 51:2 (7th ed. 2012)).
148
Kemp by Wright v. State, 687 A.2d 715, 721 (N.J. 1997) (citing State v. Roberts, 123
A.2d 1, 4 (N.J. 1956)).
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the overarching goal of effectuating legislative intent. “[T]he more specific
statute controls over the more general one, or the newer provision controls
as the latest legislative expression[.]”149
Even where a court finds one statute to prevail over the other, the court
must also take care to avoid finding a repeal by implication, which is
universally disfavored.150 “[A] court may not infer a statutory repeal ‘unless
the later statute expressly contradict[s] the original act’ or unless such a
construction is absolutely necessary. . . in order that [the] words [of the later
statute] shall have any meaning at all.”151 As the New Jersey Supreme Court
has announced, “a repeal by implication requires clear and compelling
evidence of legislative intent.”152 Further, “such intent must be free from
reasonable doubt.”153 Courts operate under the assumption that the
Legislature is familiar with the laws it passes and intends for related laws to
work together.154
Therefore, courts must apply “every reasonable
construction” in order to avoid implied repeal.155
Perhaps the most fundamental time-based canon of interpretation is that
statutory law is presumed to apply prospectively.156 This principle has been
followed since the earliest days of the common law.157 It is echoed in the Ex
Post Facto Clause of our Constitution, which requires that citizens have
notice of laws, particularly those which might impair substantive rights, and
which limits the government’s power to enact “arbitrary and potentially
vindictive legislation.”158 The United States Supreme Court holds as “a rule
of general application” that retroactivity will not apply “unless such
construction is required by explicit language or by necessary implication.”159
149

SINGER & SINGER, supra note 147.
See, e.g., Hui v. Castaneda, 559 U.S. 799, 810 (2010); New Jersey Ass’n of School
Adm’rs v. Schundler, 49 A.3d 860, 872 (N.J. 2012).
151
United States v. Sampson, 898 F.3d 287, 302 (2d Cir. 2018) (citing Traynor v.
Turnage, 485 U.S. 535, 548 (1988) (internal quotations omitted)).
152
New Jersey Ass’n of School Adm’rs v. Schundler, 49 A.3d 860, 872 (N.J. 2012),
citing Mahwah Twp. v. Bergen Cnty. Bd. of Taxation, 98 N.J. 268, 280, 486 A.2d 818, cert.
denied, 471 U.S. 1136, 105 S.Ct. 2677, 86 L.Ed.2d 696 (1985).
153
Voss v. Tranquilino, 19 A.3d 470, 471 (N.J. 2011) (citing Twp. Of Mahwah v. Bergen
Cty. Bd. Of Taxation, 486 A.2d 818, 825 (N.J. 1985)).
154
New Jersey Ass’n of Sch. Adm’rs, 49 A.3d at 872.
155
Id.
156
SINGER & SINGER, supra note 147, at § 41:4. (“The rule is that statutes are prospective,
and will not be construed to have retroactive operation unless the language employed in the
enactment is so clear it will admit of no other construction.”).
157
Landgraf v. USI Film Products, 511 U.S. 244, 265-66 (1994) (citing Kaiser
Aluminum & Chemical Corp. v. Bonjorno, 494 U.S. 827, 842–44, 855–56 (1990)). See also
Dash v. Van Kleeck, 7 Johns. 477, 503 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1811).
158
Id. at 266–67 (citing Weaver v. Graham, 450 U.S. 24, 28-29 (1981)).
159
Fernandez-Vargas v. Gonzales, 548 U.S. 30, 37 (2006) (citing United States v. St.
Louis, S.F. & T.R. Co., 270 U.S. 1, 3 (1926)).
150
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The New Jersey Supreme Court has long recognized the problematic
nature of retroactive statutes, as such an “application of new laws involves a
high risk of being unfair.”160 The court declines finding retroactivity “unless
such intention of the legislature appear clearly by its terms or by necessary
implication.”161 Consequently, there are “well-settled rules” regarding
retroactivity, absent clear legislative intent that a statute is to apply only
prospectively.162
First, and most obviously, a statute will apply retroactively where the
Legislature has explicitly intended it.163 Such an intention may be found in
the language of the statute, or in the pertinent legislative history.164 Second,
retroactivity may be impliedly intended when such an approach is necessary
to give effect to the statute or to provide a sensible interpretation.165 If the
Legislature is silent on the subject, “a prospective intent ‘may be inferred
from knowledge that courts generally will enforce newly enacted substantive
statutes prospectively.’”166
Third, retroactivity is appropriate when a statute is “ameliorative or
curative.”167 Such a statute “is designed merely to carry out or explain the
intent of the original statute” and does not impact “the intended scope or
purposes of the original act.”168 An ameliorative or curative statute clarifies
an earlier statute, but does not substantively alter it.169 Lastly, in the absence
of a clear expression of legislative intent for it to apply prospectively,
considerations like the expectations of the parties may warrant retroactive
application.170 This requires looking at the reasonable expectations of the
parties as well as the controlling law.171
However, even if a statute is intended to apply retroactively, courts will
still decline to do so if such an application would be unconstitutional, or if it
would result in “manifest injustice.”172 A manifest injustice analysis
160
161
162
163
164

Gibbons v. Gibbons, 432 A.2d 80, 84 (N.J. 1981).
Deegan v. Morrow, 31 N.J.L. 136, 138 (Sup. Ct. 1864).
Gibbons, 432 A.2d. at 84.
Id.
Id. (citing, e.g., Howard Savings Institution v. Kielb, 183 A.2d 401, 404-407 (N.J.

1962)).
165

Id.
Johnson v. Roselle EQ Quick LLC, 143 A.3d 254, 264 (N.J. 2016) (citing Maeker v.
Ross, 99 A.3d 795, 802 (N.J. 2014)) [Emphasis in the original.].
167
Johnson, 143 A.3d. at 264.
168
Id.
169
Id. (citing Schiavo v. John F. Kennedy Hosp., 609 A.2d 781, 783 (N.J. Super. Ct.
App. Div. 1992)).
170
Gibbons v. Gibbons, 432 A.2d 80, 85 (N.J. 1981).
171
Johnson, 143 A.3d. at 265.
172
Oberhand v. Director, Div. of Taxation, 940 A.2d 1202, 1210 (N.J. 2008) (citing
Nobrega v. Edison Glen Assocs., 772 A.2d 368, 378 (N.J. 2001)).
166

THARNEY(DO NOT DELETE)

2020]

4/4/2020 2:04 AM

CANONS OR COIN TOSSES

305

involves “matters of unfairness and inequity[,]” specifically, an affected
party’s reliance on prior law, and the consequences of that reliance.173
Modeled and “borrowed” statutes are laws which are copied from other
jurisdictions.174 When construing such statutes, the borrowing jurisdiction
generally is assumed to accept their prior judicial interpretations.175 Other
factors, such as the similarity of language between the original and the copy,
may also be considered.176 Model and uniform acts are drafted by the
Uniform Law Commission177 and by the American Law Institute.178 A
uniform act seeks to establish the same law on a subject, and a model act
seeks to promote uniformity (but with the understanding that the act may
only be adopted in part); such acts strive to achieve uniformity among
jurisdictions.179 Consonant with the idea of promoting uniformity is that
courts will construe model and uniform acts as other adopting jurisdictions
have done. Courts assume that when the Legislature adopts model or
uniform laws, the legislative intent is to accept the interpretation of the parent
or sister jurisdictions.180 As the New Jersey Supreme Court notes, “[t]he very
purpose of adoption of a model act is to encourage consistency in approach
in the legislative language and its application.”181
Thus, a temporal analysis of statutes helps shed light on legislative
intent, thereby aiding in statutory interpretation when the text of the statute
itself is ambiguous. By considering when a statute was enacted and utilizing
canons of construction that incorporate time as instructive in a statutory
analysis, courts can resolve ambiguities and make the laws more reliable,
and useful, to the people governed by them.
B. Post-enactment Legislative History as an Extrinsic Interpretive
Aid
Extrinsic aids relate to a statute’s history, which can be divided into
three chronological categories: pre-enactment history, enactment history,
and post-enactment history.182
Pre-enactment history includes
“circumstances and events leading up to a bill’s introduction.”183 Enactment
173

Id. (citing In re D.C., 679 A.2d 634, 648 (N.J. 1996) (internal quotations omitted)).
SINGER & SINGER, supra note 147, at § 52:2.
175
Carolene Products Co. v. U.S., 323 U.S. 18, 26 (1944).
176
Id.
177
Uniform Act, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (11th ed. 2019).
178
ALI, https://www.ali.org/about-ali/how-institute-works/. (last visited Mar. 23, 2020).
179
What
is
a
Uniform
Act?,
UNIFORM
LAW
COMMISSION,
uniformlaws.org/acts/overview/uniformacts. (last visited Feb. 2, 2020).
180
Id.
181
Thomsen v. Mercer-Charles, 901 A.2d 303, 311 (N.J. 2006).
182
SINGER & SINGER, supra note 9, § 48:1.
183
SINGER & SINGER, supra note 9, § 48:1.
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history includes “all actions taken and statements made during legislative
consideration of the original bill from the time of its introduction until final
enactment.”184 Post-enactment legislative history includes “amendments and
any other development relevant to a statute’s operation subsequent to
enactment,”185 such as reenactments, legislative acquiescence, and judicial
precedents.186 Courts view subsequent legislative history, or post-enactment
history, as less illuminating than enactment history.187 However, “[w]here
the mind labors to discover the design of the legislature, it seizes everything
from which aid can be derived.”188
The legislature’s reenactment of a statute can provide extrinsic aid. If
the legislature reenacts a statute that contains substantially similar language
as the original statute, it is viewed as a continuation of the original act and
not a new enactment.189 Under such circumstances, it is presumed that the
legislature is aware of, and has ratified, the judicial interpretations given to
the original statute.190
In Darel v. Pennsylvania Manufacturers Association Insurance
Company, a bicyclist was injured as a result of an accident involving an
automobile and sought personal injury protection (“PIP”) benefits from the
automobile’s insurer.191 The New Jersey Supreme Court considered whether
the 1983 amendment to New Jersey’s No Fault Act (N.J.S.A. 39:6A-4)
affected the eligibility requirements and the PIP benefits of the bicyclist.192
The court determined that the 1983 amendment did not affect the benefits of
the bicyclist.193 According to the court, the amendment affected eligibility
requirements for only one class of pedestrians: the named insured’s family
members who sustained bodily injury caused by the named insured’s
automobile.194 This class excluded beneficiaries, like the bicyclist plaintiff,
184

SINGER & SINGER, supra note 9, § 48:1.
SINGER & SINGER, supra note 9, § 48:1.
186
SINGER & SINGER, supra note 9, § 48:1.
187
SINGER & SINGER, supra note 9, § 48:20; see also Solid Waste Agency of Northern
Cook County v. U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, 531 U.S. 159 (2001).
188
SINGER & SINGER, supra note 9, § 48:1, (quoting Chief Justice Marshall in U.S. v.
Fisher, 6 U.S. 358 (1805)).
189
SINGER & SINGER, supra note 9, § 22:33.
190
Pierce v. Underwood, 487 U.S. 552, 567 (1988).
191
Darel v. Pennsylvania Mfrs. Ass’n Ins. Co., 114 N.J. 416 (1989).
192
Id. at 419.
193
Id. (citing N.J.S.A. 39:6A-4. The No-Fault Act created two separate classes of
pedestrians under the statute. The first class included the named insured or a familial member
of the named insured’s household who sustains an injury as a result of an accident involving
an automobile. The second class of pedestrians, “stranger” pedestrians, who were strangers
to the insurance contract, consisted of pedestrians who sustain bodily injury caused by the
named insured’s automobile or are struck by an object propelled by or from such automobile.
The plaintiff fell under the “stranger” pedestrian category).
194
Id. at 420–21
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who fell under the “stranger” pedestrian category.195 “The words controlling
the status of ‘stranger’ pedestrians are simply repeated in the amended
version of the statute” and the statutory interpretation of the court is held to
be valid when the legislature readopts and reenacts the language endorsed in
previous judicial decisions.196
In addition to reenactments, legislative acquiescence or inaction has
been deemed to indicate legislative approval of the application of law by
courts and agencies.197 “The construction of a statute by the courts,
supported by long acquiescence on the part of the Legislature, or by
continued use of the same language or failure to amend the statute, is
evidence that such construction is in accordance with the legislative
intent.”198 The presumption of acquiescence can be rebutted by conflicting
legislative and judicial history.199 It may also be asserted that the legislative
silence was due to a lack of legislative awareness of the decisions of the
courts.
The United States Supreme Court has, however, relied on legislative
inaction to interpret a statute’s ambiguity in favor of the interpretation and
application of the statute by a court or agency.200 In Bob Jones University v.
United States, the Supreme Court was faced with the question of whether
non-profit private schools that prescribe and enforce racially discriminatory
admission standards qualify as tax-exempt organizations under the Internal
Revenue Code.201 In a decision rooted in congressional acquiescence, the
Supreme Court affirmed the lower court’s decision that such educational
institutions do not qualify as tax-exempt organizations under § 501(c)(3).202
The Court noted that several bills and an amendment to the relevant statute
were introduced after IRS rulings regarding § 501(c)(3) in 1970 and 1971,203
none of which demonstrated any effort by Congress to overturn the IRS

195

Id.
Darel v. Pennsylvania Mfrs. Ass’n Ins. Co., 114 N.J. 416, 423 (1989) (citing
1A Sutherland Statutory Construction §22.33 (Sands 4th ed. 1985)).
197
William N. Eskridge Jr., Interpreting Legislative Inaction, 109 Yale Law School
Legal Scholarship Repository (1988).
198
Lemke v. Bailey, 41 N.J. 295, 301 (1963).
199
SINGER & SINGER, supra note 9, § 49:08
200
Bob Jones University v. United States, 461 U.S. 574 (1983).
201
Id.
202
Id. at 623.
203
Id. (Section 501(c)(3) of the Internal Revenue Code (“IRC”) of 1954 provided that
“[c]orporations . . . organized and operated exclusively for religious, charitable. . . or
educational proposes” are entitled to tax exemption. However, in 1970 IRS concluded that it
could no longer justify allowing tax-exempt status under § 501(c)(3) to private schools that
practiced racial discrimination, and in 1971 issued a revenue ruling stating that private schools
having racially discriminatory policy toward students will not be seen as “charitable” as
defined in § 170 of IRC and 501 (c)(3)).
196
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ruling.204 The Court concluded that the inaction of Congress left no doubt
that Congress was aware of the strong public policy against granting tax
exempt status to educational institutions with discriminatory practices.205
It is noted that while courts may consider subsequent legislative history
including amendments, reenactment, or legislative inaction when
interpreting a statute, courts will not consider a legislator’s isolated remarks
or statements subsequent to a statute’s enactment.206 In Continental Gypsum
Co. v. Director, of Div. of Taxation, the New Jersey Tax Court observed that
“[s]ubsequent legislation declaring the intent of an earlier statute is entitled
to great weight in statutory construction.”207 An individual interpretative
statement from a member of the Assembly after the enactment of a statute,
however, does not equate to the collective understanding of the entire New
Jersey legislature.208
Similarly, post-enactment statements of a legislator regarding their own
legislative intent when they voted for a specific legislation are not assigned
much weight by New Jersey courts.209 The limited credence is justified by
concerns that a legislator’s statements may be influenced by interest groups
or skewed by his or her own biases, calling into question their credibility.210
The concept of “strength in numbers” appears to hold true in statutory
interpretation since the Courts will give more weight to Assembly
Statements and Committee Reports on the bill, as they represent the many
voices of legislators involved in drafting and studying proposed legislation,
as opposed to a single voice of a legislator.211
In addition to subsequent legislative developments, it has been said that
“[s]tatutory precedent grows as case precedent grows. First, someone bolder
than the rest marks a new course. If the course appears satisfactory, others
follow. Legal science calls this the doctrine of stare decisis.”212 Stare decisis
dates back to 18th century English common law and is a Latin term meaning,

204

Id. at 600–01.
Bob Jones University v. United States, 461 U.S. 574, 600–01 (1983).
206
Continental Gypsum Co. v. Dir, Div. of Taxation, 19 N.J. Tax 221 (2000).
207
Id. at 231. (quoting Red Lion Broadcasting Co., v. FCC, 395 U.S.367, 380–81(1969)).
208
Id.
209
See New Jersey Coalition of Health Care Professionals, Inc. v. New Jersey Dept. of
Banking and Ins., Div. of Ins., 323 N.J. Super. 207 (Super. Ct. App. Div. 1999).
210
SINGER & SINGER, supra note 9, § 48:16.
211
Continental Gypsum Co., 19 NJ. Tax at 231. (quoting State v. Yothers, 282 N.J.
Super. 86, 105 (1995) (citing Garcia v. United States, 469 U.S. 70, 76 (1984))).
212
SINGER & SINGER, supra note 9, § 1:3. See also Payne v. Tennessee, 501 U.S. 808,
827 (1991) (The doctrine of stare decisis serve number of policy goals. The doctrine
“promotes the evenhanded, predictable, and consistent development of legal principles,
fosters reliance on judicial decisions, and contributes to the actual and perceived integrity of
the judicial process.”).
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“to stand by that which is decided.”213 It refers to the courts’ practice of
following prior cases when making a ruling on a case with similar facts.214
This common law principal promotes a respect for judicial decisions,
uniformity, stability, and predictability in the development of legal
principles.215 Following precedent also enhances judicial efficiency.216
Legal questions litigated in the past allow present and future courts to decide
similar issues by analogy, rather than by employing fresh analysis each time.
It is also a cost-efficient method; both courts and litigating parties save
expenses in relitigating similar issues.217 Courts have “always required a
departure from precedent to be supported by some special justification.”218
As Justice Cardozo explained in his treatise on the common law, “[e]very
new case is an experiment; and if the accepted rule which seems applicable
yields a result which is felt to be unjust, the rule is reconsidered.”219
Amendment and reenactment of a statute, legislative acquiescence, and
judicial precedents are some of the different tools the courts utilize to assist
in statutory interpretation. Canons based on extrinsic sources play a crucial
role in resolving statutory ambiguity, but the interpretive weight they merit
is ultimately entrusted to the courts.
III. CONCLUSION
Although not uniformly embraced, and despite the acknowledgement
of contradictory canons, hundreds of years of case law illustrate that the
canons of statutory interpretation have been, and continue to be, useful
interpretive aids for courts faced with statutory language that fails, on its
face, to provide sufficient clarify.
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